DFdom@fradley
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$ cat identity-is-the-perimeter.md

Identity is your security perimeter now

The old model put a firewall at the boundary, treated the inside as trusted and the outside as hostile. In a cloud estate that stopped describing reality a while ago. Your services talk to each other and to Azure's own APIs over the public backbone, authenticated by tokens, so the check that matters happens on each call.

THEN one wall, around the network Firewall stops the internet Virtual network App Service Cosmos DB API Management they trust each other purely by being inside NOW a gate on every call App managed identity Admin signs in with MFA Pipeline workload identity Entra ID Conditional Access PIM, just-in-time Storage Key Vault Subscription 1 2
The check moved from the edge to every call in the estate: (1) the caller proves who it is, (2) the token decides what it can reach.

Managed identities instead of stored secrets

A credential in config or a pipeline variable can end up in a log, a repo or a screenshot. A managed identity has nothing to leak: Azure issues and rotates the credential and your code never sees it. In Terraform it's a few lines:

resource "azurerm_user_assigned_identity" "app" {
  name                = "app-identity"
  resource_group_name = azurerm_resource_group.app.name
  location            = azurerm_resource_group.app.location
}

resource "azurerm_role_assignment" "app_reads_storage" {
  scope                = azurerm_storage_account.data.id
  role_definition_name = "Storage Blob Data Reader"
  principal_id         = azurerm_user_assigned_identity.app.principal_id
}

The app authenticates as that identity and gets the Storage Blob Data Reader role on that one account.

Conditional Access, just-in-time admin and least privilege

Conditional Access decides who is signing in, from where, on what device and at what risk level, and what they must pass to get through. Requiring multifactor for admins and blocking legacy authentication both sit here, which makes it a bigger lever on your posture than any network ACL.

Privileged Identity Management activates a role for an hour when it's needed and lets it expire. A permanent Owner assignment gives an attacker standing access, whereas a stolen session with no standing roles has little to use.

For roles, a custom role you can describe in one sentence is easier to review than a pile of Owner grants whose approvals nobody remembers.

The full, runnable version is in the blog-examples repo.

Next: why your architect should be able to tell you what the design costs before anything ships.

discuss on linkedin → more writing